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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
CORPORATIONS -DOCTRINE OF CORPORATE
OPPORTUNITY
Legal doctrines insofar as they constitute endeavors to define cri-
teria of conduct upon which legal consequences can be determined have
served a useful purpose in the law. The doctrine of corporate oppor-
tunity, as adopted by the court in Guth v. Loft,1 attempts to lay down
certain guides to aid in determining whether a director, officer or man-
ager of a corporation is violating his fiduciary duty in engaging in a
business competing with that of the corporation of which he is a direc-
tor, officer or manager.
The general rule is, where the business is definitely a competing
business with that of the corporation, the directors are not per se pro-
hibited from engaging in the competing business providing they are in
good faith and the competing business does not cripple or hinder or
injure the business of the corporation.2 A simple example is found in
a California case 3 in which the court granted an injunction and damages
where a director of a florist corporation aided in the financing of a
new florist concern, worked for it and solicited plaintiff's customers
for sales by the new concern. Also the Red Top Cab4 case where the
court imposed a trust for the benefit of the corporation on profits aris-
ing from a cab business organized by defendant, director and manag-
ing agent of the plaintiff corporation, likewise engaged in the cab busi-
ness, and where defendant director used the employees and facilities
of plaintiff corporation in the competing business. The theory behind
these cases is that while a director is not strictly a trustee, he occupies
a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders and his acts
must be for the benefit of the corporation and its stockholders and not
for himself. He cannot enrich himself at their expense.5
While it may be objectively determinable whether the competing
business does or does not cripple or injure the business of the cor-
poration, the question of good faith, involving as it does a subjective
determination, is more difficult to ascertain.' Thus it would seem that
a standard containing determinable factual elements capable of ob-
jective application would more adequately and practically solve the
pertinent issue: "Is the particular business opportunity involved one
which the director may appropriate to himself without the violation of
his fiduciary relation to his corporation ?"
'Guth v. Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.(2d) 503 (1939).
2 19 C.J.S. 785; Bump Co. v. Waukesha Foundry Co., 238 Wis. 643, 300 N.W.
500 (1941).
3 Hall v. Dekker, 45 Cal. App. 783, 115 P. (2d) 15 (1941).
4 Red Top Cab Co. v. Hanschett, 48 F. (2d) 236 (1931).
5 Golden Rod Mining Co. v. Bukvich, 108 Mont. 569, 92 P. (2d) 316 (1939).
6 Although it would seem the appropriation by the director of the corporation's
facilities etc., would constitute an important factor in determining good faith.
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The purpose and scope of this article is to discuss the elements of
the doctrine of corporate opportunity together with an analysis of the
interpretation and application of each element as made by the courts
both before and after the decision of Guth v. Loft.
The definition of corporate opportunity is presented in Guth v. Loft
as merely one of the manifestations of the general rule that demands
of corporate officers or directors the utmost good faith. To determine
whether a business opportunity is one which the director or officer can
appropriate the court laid down the the elements discussed below. If
these elements are established in a given case the enterprise is one which
the law will not permit the officer or director to seize for himself.
1. The corporation is financially able to undertake the business op-
portunity presented. There is a conflict of authority on this point as pre-
sented in other cases. In Pioneer Oil & Gas Co. v. Anderson7 the court
declined to apply the doctrine of corporate opportunity because the
corporation was not in a position to take advantage of the enterprise
due to three factors: the financial inability of the corporation; the un-
willingness of the third party to deal with it in the prior negotiations
made by the corporation for the purchase of the land involved; the in-
advisibility of the venture. In contradistinction is Irving Trust Co. v.
Deutsch" which held that the directors could not appropriate the oppor-
tunity to themselves even where it is shown that the corporation is
financially unable to purchase. This case can be distinguished, however,
on the ground that had the director paid his indebtedness to the cor-
poration, the latter would have been financially able to adopt the oppor-
tunity. In justification of its decision the court said that if the strict
rule were not followed the directors would be tempted to refrain from
exerting their best efforts to obtain financial aid for the corporation
because of the conflict of interest presented.
2. The business opportunity is, from its nature, in the line of the
corporation's business. That this element is clearly capable of ascer-
tainment is shown in the situations where the opportunity was held not
to be in the line of the corporation's business and consequently per-
missible for the directors or officers of the corporation to engage in.9
7 Pioneer Oil & Gas Co. v. Anderson, 168 Miss. 334, 151 So. 161 (1933).8 Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 3 F. (2d) 121 (2d cir., 1934).
9 Broderick v. Blanton, 59 N.Y.S. (2d) 136 (1945), directors of corporation
bought on their own bulk whisky in barrels for speculation whereas the plain-
tiff corporation was engaged in distilling and bottling liquor for sale to
customers as its own product and unless absolutely necessary did not sell
liquors manufactured by others, and when it did bought for use and not
speculation. Also Lancaster Loose Leaf Tobacco Co. v. Robinson, 199 Ky.
313, 250 S.W. 997 (1923), where the tobacco company had never engaged in
the business of buying tobacco from farmers, the president of the company
was allowed to buy tobacco from farmers on his own account; Diedreick v.
Helm, 217 Minn. 483, 14 N.W. (2d) 913 (1944), where directors of a building
and loan association were permitted to buy stock in an insurance agency
1951]
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3. The business opportunity is of practical advantage to the cor-
poration. Clearly illustrative of this factor is Turner v. American Metal
Co.1" which held that the directors of the plaintiff corporation were
not liable for purchasing an interest in a new corporation organized to
operate an enterprise dealing with a newly discovered alloy, when at
the time the alloy was not established as a scientific reliable product and
it was consequently of no practical advantage to the plaintiff corpora-
tion to undertake this enterprise at the time. The court went on to say
that no corporate opportunity was present because the enterprise was
not an expansion of any existing department of the plaintiff corpora-
tion, but a new industry, for which the plaintiff corporation did not
have the fundamental knowledge or practical experience with which
to exploit the venture. There was present no inherent aptitude of being
intergrated into the existing business of the corporation.
4. The business opportunity is one in which the corporation has an
interest or reasonable expectancy. Of all the elements this particular
one is most susceptible to varied interpretations as evidenced by the
decisions. In the Colorado Utah Coal Co."- case the court held that no
corporate opportunity was violated when the defendant director secret-
ly purchased coal land although there was evidence that the plaintiff
corporation was investigating and considering the purchase of the
property in question in addition to extensive investigations as to numer-
ous other coal lands. Holding that the burden is on the plaintiff to
establish expectancy, the court said it was bound to establish not only
that the property in question possessed value to it, but that it had a
practical, not a mere theoretical use therefor. Here the plaintiff cor-
poration was operating in a territory of unlimited extent and if the
doctrine of expectancy was extended to cover this territory, plaintiff
would have a virtual monopoly in this territory. In another case in-
volving the purchase of lands, the director purchased an interest in
certain lands in which the plaintiff corporation had an existing lease of
a one-third interest, a contract to purchase a one-third interest, and had
been negotiating for purchase of the remainder of the property. In hold-
ing that the director could not oust the corporation from beneficial
property rights the court would not permit the director to interfere with
which sold insurance to borrowers of the plaintiff building and loan associa-
tion because interpretation of the law prohibited the association from acting
as an agent in receiving premiums on insurance as did also a by-law of the
association. The court said that where a corporation declines because of legal
barriers or it is the settled policy of the corporation not to engage in the
particular business, the directors may engage in that field. For examples of
competing business in line with the corporation's business see Hall v. Dekker,
Supra, Note 3; Red Top Cab Co. v. Hanschett, Supra, Note 4.
10 Turner v. American Metal Co., 268 App. Div. 239, 50 N.Y.S. (2d) 800 (1944).
"Colorado Utah Coal Co. v. Harris, 97 Col. 309, 49 P. (2d) 429 (1935).12 Legarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co., 126 Ala. 496, 28 So. 199 (1900).
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the interest in the lease and the existing contract on the ground of the
presence of a reasonable expectancy attending these interests. However,
the court goes on to say there is no expectancy of value when a cor-
poration has been negotiating and endeavoring to purchase. "Legal re-
strictions on officers or directors in their acquisitions are generally
limited to property wherein the corporation has an interest already ex-
isting, or in which it has an expectancy growing out of an existing
right." A current problem is exemplified in Lincoln Stores v. Grant13
where defendant directors purchased and operated a store similar in
nature to the branch store operated by plaintiff corporation across the
street. In developing the business of the new store they used plaintiff's
records, inventories, and charged traveling expenses to the plaintiff's
corporation as two of the directors maintained their positions with the
plaintiff corporation while one resigned to operate the new store. Sev-
eral years before, the corporation had considered acquiring additional
floor space for the corporation's stores but decided it was not feasible
at the time and later decided not to take an option whereby they could
have secured this objective in different premises. The court refused to
impose a constructive trust on the stock of the defendants in the new
store because the corporation did not show any interest in or need the
store-in the words of the court-the corporation had no interest or
expectancy in the store as its acquisition had never been considered and
they were no longer interested in acquiring additional floor space at
this time. The court, however, decreed damages on profits lost due to
the competing business and ordered a refund of the paid expenses and
salaries. 14
It has been said that the Guth v. Loft decision goes farther than
most decisions in holding the doctrine of corporate opportunity to apply
where there is an opportunity to expand or increase the present busi-
ness. Whereas other decisions only apply the doctrine where the oppor-
tunity is essential to the existence of the corporation and are reluctant
to apply it where the opportunity does not have a close and peculiar
relationship to the immediate corporate interests and needs.' 5
5. The business opportunity when embraced by the officer or di-
rector will cause the self-interest of the latter to be brought into conflict
with that of the corporation. This point is self-evident based as it is
on the basic rule of human nature that no man can serve two masters.
In order to more comprehensively understand the practical applica-
tion of the doctrine of corporate opportunity to a given set of circum-
stances it might be well to consider specifically the facts in Guth v. Loft.
"s Lincoln Stores v. Grant, 309 Mass. 417, 34 N.E. (2d) 704 (1941).14This decision is criticized in 55 Harv. L. Rev. 866-8 on the ground that a con-
structive trust remedy should have been applied.
25 31 Calif. L. Rev. 188-99.
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The Loft Company, a corporation engaged in manufacturing and sell-
ing candies, beverage syrups and foodstuffs, wholesale and retail,
manufactured all their own syrups, but coca-cola, which they jobbed
from the Coca-Cola Company. Guth, a director of Loft Company, who
controlled Loft's board of directors, suggested replacing coca-cola syrup
with another which could be purchased at a lower price. One possibil-
ity was pepsi-cola syrup. The Pepsi-Cola Company, however, was bank-
rupt, but Guth and another formed a new corporation to acquire the
pepsi-cola formula and trademark for the manufacture and sale of that
product. Guth drew at one time on almost the entire working capital
of the Loft Company, used Loft's plant, facilities, materials, credit,
executives and employees. The payroll sheet of the new corporation
was a part of Loft's and a single Loft check was drawn for both. No
charge was made for the use of the plant, facilities and service rendered
by the executive, high ranking employees and chemist. At all times Loft
Company was able to finance the project. Due to its discontinuance of
coca-cola it spent large amounts in advertising this new product and
suffered losses of profits at its stores from the discount of coca-cola.
The new company formed by Guth sold the pepsi-cola product to Loft
Company, one of its customers, at a profit.
The pertinent elements supporting the decision rendered in Guth v.
Loft can be briefly summarized as follows:
1. Loft Company possessed sufficient assets to finance the enter-
prise.
2. Loft Company possessed the plant equipment, executives,
personnel and facilities, all of which were adequate supplies
by expansion for the necessary development of the business.
3. Loft Company Was engaged in the manufacture of syrups and
with the exception of a cola syrup supplied its own needs.
4. Loft Company did have an interest or expectancy in the
Pepsi-Cola business as it was a necessity to sell and acquire
a cola drink as it had stopped selling coca-cola.
5. A conflict of duty was created by the director, Guth, in his
dual capacity of controlling the supply of pepsi-cola and de-
termining his price and terms so that in offering pepsi-cola
to Loft Company, he also had the power as Loft to accept. In
the words of the court "he made himself a judge in his own
cause."
6. In the manufacture of pepsi-cola, Guth used at one time the
entire working capital of Loft Company.
7. Guth used Loft's plant, facilities, materials, credit, executives
and employees.
As with any legal doctrine or theory the doctrine of corporate op-
portunity is no exception to the inevitable practice of subjection to vari-
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ous interpretations and applications. However, one cannot but help ob-
serve that the distinctions found (as shown in the cited cases) can al-
most always be justified by the peculiar facts involved there. The merits
of the doctrine of corporate opportunity are self-evident. To the enter-
prising director and to the attorney advising his director or corporate
client the doctrine of corporate opportunity as enunciated in Guth v.
Loft establishes a veritable legal guidepost.
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